


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3 June 1959

Notes on Progress:



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2. I also talked with [redacted], Geographic Area, ORR on the feasibility of a lecture on the basic geography of the U.S.S.R. that would illustrate from a specially prepared map the natural routes from Russia of attack and the necessary places where defensive installations would be set up. Later lecturers could place on this map the more specific targets of ELINT collection. [redacted] said that he would see if he could offer anything and would report later.

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4. [redacted], Chief, ELINT Operations Branch, SPS, OC, began on Tuesday afternoon, to brief me on the basic theory and mechanisms of ELINT.

5. Finally, [redacted], ELINT Staff Officer, OSI, explained to me, first the peculiar interests of OSI and, next, the uses to which CIA could put the information secured primarily for the services. He pointed out, for example, that a changing radar OB had great importance to ORR in showing the productive capacity of the USSR and that the changes of design were of great interest to OSI. Also, he mentioned the information we were getting on missile trials and designs.

NO CHANGE in Class. ☐

☐ DECLASSIFIED

Class. CHANGED TO: TS S

DDA Memo, 4 Apr 77

Auth: DDA REG. 77/1763

Date: 17 JAN 78 By: [redacted]

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Notes on Progress:

6. These interviews have greatly clarified objectives: First of all, there is the need to explain the difference between what the services want and what OSI is after. The former need urgently information that will enable them to blunt or abolish the threat of radar by sea and land; the latter is searching for scientific advances, the scientific breakthrough, the weapons and satellites of the future.

Next, there is the need for understanding the necessity for harmonious teamwork in collection. Broad, general collection can be made from fixed sites, from airborne, and from seaborne units that are extremely sophisticated; [redacted] is directed toward targets that have been previously identified and pinpointed, and for which precise requirements have been formulated.



7. Something of the contents of the course begins to appear:



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